Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets Articles uri icon

publication date

  • May 2023

start page

  • 591

end page

  • 623


  • 75

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0938-2259

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-0479


  • We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms in which hospitals make
    simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. We prove that all pure strategy sub-
    game perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are stable, but the inclusion of contracts
    shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis reveals the existence of an
    advantage in setting the terms of the relationship that is absent from the model with-
    out contracts. The mechanisms of this class are outcome equivalent and implement the
    set of stable allocations in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when competitive rivalry
    is present. The equilibrium outcomes form a lattice when preferences are substitutable.


  • Economics


  • contracts; many-to-many; sequential; take-it-or-leave-it