Peace Agreements without Commitment Articles uri icon

publication date

  • March 2010

start page

  • 469

end page

  • 487


  • 2


  • 68

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0899-8256

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1090-2473


  • In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring
    money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers
    part of its money to the "poor" country. But when the military
    proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently high the "poor"
    country stops the war by transferring part of its resources to the
    "rich" country. War cannot be avoided by transfers when inequality of
    resources is very large or the cost of war is sufficiently low.