publication venue for Mechanism design with informational punishment. 140:197-209. 2023 Valence, complementarities, and political polarization. 128:39-57. 2021 Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee. 127:1-27. 2021 Giving in to social pressure. 99:99-116. 2016 Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets. 87:624-630. 2014 Entry and espionage with noisy signals. 83:127-146. 2014 Heterogeneous network games: conflicting preferences. 79:56-66. 2013 Comment on: "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences". 74:235-239. 2012 Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms. 73:360-374. 2011 Second best efficiency and the English auction. 73:496-506. 2011 Social interactions and spillovers. 72:339-360. 2011 The Insider's Curse. 71:339-350. 2011 Peace Agreements without Commitment. 68:469-487. 2010 On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium. 68:77-94. 2010 Undominated (and) Perfect Equilibria in Poisson Games. 66:775-784. 2009 Information Acqusition in Auctions: Sealed Bids vs Open Bids. 2:372-405. 2009 School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms. 64:303-328. 2008