A fair procedure in a marriage market Articles uri icon

publication date

  • September 2024

start page

  • 533

end page

  • 550

volume

  • 28

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1434-4742

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1434-4750

abstract

  • We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.

subjects

  • Economics

keywords

  • two-sided matching; fair procedure; deferred acceptance algorithm; c72; c78; d41