full text https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85096840219&doi=10.1093%2fwber%2flhz014&partnerID=40&md5=f4c45921c8af7c1021539af86d2b8194
abstract Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents' political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office. © 2019 The Author(s).
keywords civil conflict election fraud institutional weaknesses philippines democracy election electoral geography institutional framework local government performance assessment political instability political violence philippines