Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets Articles uri icon

publication date

  • March 2021

start page

  • 105

end page

  • 118


  • 1


  • 50

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0020-7276

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-1270


  • We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents' preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.


  • Economics


  • acyclicity; many-to-many; stability; strategy-proofness