Managerial incentives for attracting attention Articles uri icon

publication date

  • September 2020

start page

  • 896

end page

  • 937


  • 4


  • 26

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1354-7798

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1468-036X


  • This paper studies the mechanisms which motivate managers to engage in cheap talk and attract the market's attention in a credible way. We consider stock split announcements, voluntary earnings forecasts, and press releases issued by firms to the media as proxies for managerial cheap talk. We show that: (a) managerial performance‐related pay contracts incentivize executives to attract attention; (b) analysts increase their coverage of firms following cheap talk; and (c) chief executive officers are punished for attracting attention when market prices do not increase following cheap talk. The results are stronger for firms which are most in need of attention.


  • attracting attention; ceo compensation; cheap talk; managerial incentives; voluntary disclosures