Strategy-proof Fair School Placement (EEE-ESEM, 2014) Conference Contributions uri icon


  • European Economic Association & Econometric Society
    2014 Parallel Meetings

event place

  • Toulouse



participation category


main title

  • This paper provides an 'escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of fairness, called tau -fairness, which is always non-empty.Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange Place rule, a procedure that assigns a tau -fair allocation to each problem. When students' preferences are restricted to satisfy the Top Dominance condition (Alcaldeand Barberà, 1994), the mechanism is strategy-proof.

publication date

  • 2014


  • school choice problem; fair matching; top dominance condition; strategy-proofness