Endogenous strength in conflicts Articles uri icon

publication date

  • May 2013

start page

  • 297

end page

  • 306


  • 3


  • 31

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-7187

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1873-7986


  • In this paper we study a two period contest where the strength of players in the second period depends on the result of the contest in the first stage. We show that in contrast to one-shot contests in the same setting, heterogeneous players exert different efforts in the first stage and rent dissipation in the first period may be large. We study the conditions under which the discouragement effect holds. In addition, new issues emerge like the evolution of the strengths and the shares of the prize during the game.


  • contests; conflict; strength; dynamic