Migration with Local Public Goods and the Gains from Changing Places Articles uri icon

authors

  • SEMPERE CAMPELLO, JAIME
  • HAMMOND, PETER

publication date

  • June 2009

start page

  • 359

end page

  • 377

issue

  • 3

volume

  • 41

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0938-2259

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-0479

abstract

  • Without public goods and under fairly standard assumptions, in Hammond and Sempere (J Pub Econ Theory, 8: 145&-170, 2006) we show that freeing migration enhances the potential Pareto gains from free trade. Here, we present a generalization allowing local public goods subject to congestion. Unlike the standard literature on fiscal externalities, our result relies on fixing both local public goods and congestion levels at their status quo values. This allows constrained efficient and potentially Pareto improving population exchanges regulated only through appropriate residence charges, which can be regarded as Pigouvian congestion taxes.