Welfare Losses Under Cournot Competition Articles uri icon

authors

  • CORCHON DIAZ, LUIS CARLOS

publication date

  • September 2008

start page

  • 1120

end page

  • 1131

issue

  • 5

volume

  • 26

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-7187

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1873-7986

abstract

  • In a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and produce with constant returns, the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases. We study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms. We provide exact formulae of PWL and robust constructions of markets were PWL is close to one in these two cases. We show that the market structure that maximizes PWL is either monopoly or dominant firm, depending on demand. Finally we prove that PWL is minimized when all firms are identical, a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of PWL downwards.