Non-Monotoniticies and the All-Pay Auction Tie-Breaking Rule Articles uri icon

authors

  • ARAUJO, ALOISIO
  • CASTRO FILHO, LUCIANO IRINEU DE
  • MOREIRA, HUMBERTO

publication date

  • June 2008

start page

  • 407

end page

  • 440

issue

  • 3

volume

  • 35

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0938-2259

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-0479

abstract

  • Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.