Competing with asking prices Articles uri icon

publication date

  • May 2017

start page

  • 731

end page

  • 770

issue

  • 2

volume

  • 12

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1933-6837

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1555-7561

abstract

  • In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that, by using an asking price, sellers both maximize their revenue and implement the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it to explore the implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations