On Testimonial Justice Online. Nuancing Karen Frost-Arnold's Optimistic Virtue Epistemology Articles uri icon

published in

publication date

  • September 2024

start page

  • 169

end page

  • 178

volume

  • 93

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1130-0507

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1989-4651

abstract

  • In Who Should We Be Online, Karen Frost-Arnold advocates an approach to epistemic virtues that resists pessimism about the possibility of our online epistemic agency being responsible and socially just. On the basis of a veritist epistemology, her proposal overcomes both responsibilist individualism and the socio-structural critique that delegates all responsibility to institutional transformations. The author identifies in online lurking an activity unique to online epistemic agency that can provide exposure to messages from people discriminated against by epistemic injustices. For Frost-Arnold, moreover, this implies the possibility of the lurker experiencing epistemic frictions that will favour a more reliable willingness to be fair in giving credit to the testimonies of those discriminated against. In this note I will qualify this optimistic stance, arguing the epistemic individualism that underlies it. I will point to a group virtue model as a possible solution.

subjects

  • Philosophy

keywords

  • epistemología de la virtud; testimonio online; deferencia; lurkers; confianza; humildad