The European Boards of Bank Supervision and Bank Resolution: Balancing independence with democratic accountability? Articles
Overview
published in
publication date
- October 2022
start page
- 77
end page
- 110
issue
- 2
volume
- 1
full text
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
- 2938-0642
abstract
-
This paper reviews the complex balance between democratic
accountability and independence of the European Boards of Bank
Supervision and of Bank Resolution, within the core of the European
Banking Union. For that purpose, it first examines the legal bases of such
attribution of independence to each of these Boards. It also reviews the
dialectics between independence and democratic accountability in the
appointment and resignation regime of the members, and in oversight of
the performance, of the respective Boards. The analysis differentiates
between both organs because the ECB is not the independent body to
which the SRM Regulation confers the managing and implementing of
its provisions, but to an ad hoc body, the SRB, whose direct source of
creation is the SRM Regulation itself. In this scenario, the balance
between the independence unfolds in a different legal setting to that of
the SSM, provided that such independence (like the ECB itself) is a
direct creation of EU primary law. In addition to this peculiarity, another,
no less significant, lies in the fact that the funding of the SRF is governed
by an intergovernmental Treaty between the Member States
participating in the SRM. Such difference concerning the SSM has
specific implications for the SRM precisely from the standpoint of the
European democratic legitimacy, in terms of institutional origin, but also
of appointment and dismissal of its members, as well as of performance,
all of which are also dealt with in this paper. Finally, the paper reaches
the consequent legal conclusions, the main of those being the resulting
imbalance between democracy and ‘technocracy".
Classification
subjects
- Law
keywords
- ecb’s council of supervision; single resolution board; independence; democratic accountability; consejo de supervisión del banco central europeo; junta única de supervisión; independencia; rendición de cuentas democráticas; conseil de surveillance de la banque centrale européenne; conseil de surveillance unique; indépendance; responsabilité démocratique