What Makes Law Law: Categorial Trends in Analytic Legal Metaphysics Articles uri icon

authors

  • GKOUVAS, TRIANTAFYLLOS

publication date

  • July 2023

start page

  • 480

end page

  • 509

issue

  • 4

volume

  • 14

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 2040-3313

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 2040-3321

abstract

  • Appeals to metaphysics have lately come to ascendancy in analytic legal philosophy. Over the last 20 years or so, a new discourse framework has emerged in analytic legal metaphysics that focusses on the explanatory question of how law is made. By any measure the most influential refinement of this question is to be found in Mark Greenberg's seminal 2004 article How Facts Make Law. This essay tries to exert some pressure on this familiar question by posing the categorial question of what type of entities different theories of law take up as ontologically basic for their inquiry. The essay singles out four exemplary avenues for answering the categorial question. Introducing a categorial instead of explanatory lens is an overdue step in the process of updating the metaphysical toolbox of contemporary analytic theories of law. The categorial question of what kind of entity law is ismeant to complement the explanatory question of how law is made in a way that makes disagreements about the metaphysical-explanatory demands of theories of law more tractable or amenable to principled adjudication.

subjects

  • Law

keywords

  • legal metaphysics; categories; grounding; artefacts; facts; substance