Daring to fail: Input-oriented voting under supranational policy constraints

Recent literature argues that with ever-increasing levels of supranational constraints governments have less "room to manoeuvre"; therefore, voters will place less weight on policy outcomes in their voting decisions. The question that remains less explored is how voters fill this accountability gap. We argue that, in this context, voters may move away from outcome- to input-oriented voting. Fulfilling their promises becomes less vital for incumbents as long as they exhibit effort to overturn an unpopular policy framework. We test this argument against a survey experiment conducted in the run-up to the September 2015 election in Greece, where we find a positive impact of the incumbent's exerted effort to challenge the status quo of austerity on vote intention for SYRIZA - the senior coalition government partner at the time - despite the failed outcome of the government's bailout negotiations.

economic voting; globalization; greece; supranational constraints; survey experiment

Daring to fail: Input-oriented voting under supranational policy constraints Articles