Leaving the darkness: The emergence of shadow banks Articles uri icon

publication date

  • July 2022

start page

  • 1

end page

  • 8


  • 61

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1572-3089

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1878-0962


  • This paper studies the interaction between bank capital regulation, moral hazard and co-existence of traditional and shadow banks. Bank managers can choose between traditional banking and off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles (SPV), in a setup with deposit insurance and moral hazard. We first show that in the absence of SPV intermediation, capital requirements are ineffective at preventing the moral hazard problem originated by deposit insurance. We find that shadow banks can improve financial stability, when there is full information sharing. Finally, we analyze the case of neglected tail risk. We find that under such circumstances, the SPV will increase financial risk by exposing the system to extreme events.


  • Economics


  • capital requirements; deposit insurance; guarantees; moral hazard; shadow banks tail risk