Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard Articles uri icon

publication date

  • September 2021

start page

  • 1

end page

  • 23


  • 78

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-7187

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1873-7986


  • We study coordination among competitors in the shadow of a market mechanism. Our main example is standard setting: either firms coordinate through a standard-setting organization (SSO), or a market solution—a standards war—emerges. A firms veto to participate in the SSO triggers a standards war. Participation constraints are demanding, and the optimal SSO can involve on-path vetoes. We show that vetoes are effectively deterred if firms can (partially) release their private information to the public. We discuss several business practices that can serve as a signaling device to provide that information and to effectively ensure coordination.


  • Business
  • Economics


  • innovation; standard-setting organizations; patents; persuasion; coordination