A capture theory of committees Articles
Overview
published in
- PUBLIC CHOICE Journal
publication date
- October 2018
start page
- 135
end page
- 154
volume
- 177
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
full text
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
- 0048-5829
Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)
- 1573-7101
abstract
- Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who are uninformed or who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger when outsiders have larger stakes in its decision or contribute lower-quality proposals, or when its members are more corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes helps deter capture.
Classification
subjects
- Business
- Economics
keywords
- committee; capture; bribe; threat; disclosure