Politically Connected Audit Committees, Earnings Quality and External Financing: Evidence from Korea Articles
Overview
published in
publication date
- August 2017
start page
- 609
end page
- 634
issue
- 4
volume
- 46
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
- 2041-9945
Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)
- 2041-6156
abstract
- Using listed firms with audit committees in the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) market, we find that firms with a politically connected audit committee have higher earnings quality than those without such connections. We also find that firms with a politically connected audit committee have better access to equity financing, but obtain a larger amount of funds only when their earnings quality is higher. Overall, contrary to popular concerns over the negative influence of political connections, our results suggest that audit committees having political connections fulfil their crucial oversight duties.
Classification
keywords
- audit committee; political connections; earnings quality; external financing