Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences Articles uri icon

publication date

  • May 2017

start page

  • 120

end page

  • 123


  • 154

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0165-1765

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1873-7374


  • Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere voting is an equilibrium strategy for an arbitrarily large proportion of voters. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


  • Economics


  • voting; information; conflicting preferences; fractionalisation; condorcet jury theorem; information aggregation