Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms Articles uri icon

publication date

  • October 2015

start page

  • 28

end page

  • 32

volume

  • 60

international standard serial number (ISSN)

  • 0304-4068

electronic international standard serial number (EISSN)

  • 1873-1538

abstract

  • We show the generic finiteness of the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria for two-person game forms such that either (i) one of the players has no more than two strategies or (ii) both of the players have three strategies, and (iii) for outcome game forms with three players, each with at most two strategies. Finally, we exhibit an example of a game form with three outcomes and three players for which the Nash equilibria of the associated game induce a continuum of payoffs for an open non-empty set of utility profiles. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

keywords

  • n-person games; generic finiteness; distributions