Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets Articles uri icon

authors

  • Lester, Benjamin
  • VISSCHERS, LODEWIJK PIETER
  • WOLTHOFF, RONALD

publication date

  • January 2015

start page

  • 1

end page

  • 15

volume

  • 155

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0531

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-7235

abstract

  • In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call "invariance," and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition. Published by Elsevier Inc.

keywords

  • directed search; offer auctions; efficiency; prices; equilibrium; assignment; sellers