Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains Articles uri icon

authors

  • MARTINEZ RICO, RICARDO
  • MORENO, BERNARDO

publication date

  • December 2013

start page

  • 323

end page

  • 333

issue

  • 4

volume

  • 17

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1434-4742

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1434-4750

abstract

  • We study a problem in which a group of voters must decide which candidates are elected from a set of alternatives. The voters' preferences on the combinations of elected candidates are represented by linear orderings. We propose a family of restrictions of the domain of separable preferences. These subdomains are generated from a partition that identifies the friends, enemies and unbiased candidates for each voter. We characterize the family of social choice functions that satisfy strategy-proofness and tops-onlyness properties on each of the subdomains. We find that these domain restrictions are not accompanied by an increase in the family of social choice functions satisfying the two properties.

keywords

  • preference aggregation; strategy-proofness; tops-onlyness; voting by committees; single-peakedness; general result; manipulation; voters