Doubts and equilibria Articles uri icon

publication date

  • September 2013

start page

  • 783

end page

  • 810


  • 4


  • 23

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0936-9937

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-1386


  • In real life strategic interactions decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled with (and mutually reinforced by) imperfect discrimination capacity, which we model by means of similarity relations. These cognitive features, together with an adaptive learning process guiding agents' choice behavior leads to doubt-based selection dynamic systems. We introduce the concept of Mixed Strategy Doubt Equilibrium and study its relationship with the Nash equilibrium concept.


  • adaptive behavior;doubts;similarities relations