Simulating digital dividend auctions: Service neutrality versus dedicated licences Articles uri icon

publication date

  • February 2012

start page

  • 11

end page

  • 25


  • 29

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0736-5853

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1879-324X


  • The award of the digital dividend can consolidate auctions as the preferred mechanism for spectrum allocation. Knowing in advance an estimate of what the results of an auction with these characteristics could be would be unquestionably useful for those in charge of designing the process, even if at the end another method such as a beauty contest is chosen. This article provides a simulation of a digital dividend auction in a major-type European country. In one of the scenarios, the spectrum is not pre-allocated to any service in particular (service neutrality) while in the remaining four, blocks of spectrum are pre-allocated to OTT, mobile multimedia and mobile broadband communications. The results of the simulations reveal that the service neutrality scenario maximizes revenues for the seller and that, in general, DTT operators would seem to have fewer opportunities as the spectrum packaging is less protective for them.