Can Gender Parity Break the Glass Ceiling? Evidence from a Repeated Randomized Experiment Articles
Overview
published in
- REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Journal
publication date
- October 2010
start page
- 1301
end page
- 1328
issue
- 4
volume
- 77
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
- 0034-6527
Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)
- 1467-937X
abstract
-
This paper studies whether the gender composition of recruiting committees matters. We make use of the unique evidence provided by Spanish public examinations, where the allocation of candidates to
evaluating committees is random. We analyse how the chances of success
of 150,000 female and male candidates for positions in the four main
Corps of the Spanish Judiciary from 1987 to 2007 were affected by the
gender composition of their evaluation committee. We find that a female
(male) candidate is significantly less likely to be hired whenever she
(he) is randomly assigned to a committee where the share of female
(male) evaluators is relatively greater. Evidence from multiple choice
tests suggests that this is due to the fact that female majority
committees overestimate the quality of male candidates.