Multibidding Game under Uncertainty Articles uri icon

authors

  • VESZTEG, ROBERT FERENC

publication date

  • September 2010

start page

  • 311

end page

  • 329

issue

  • 3-4

volume

  • 14

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1434-4742

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1434-4750

abstract

  • This paper considers situations in which a group of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I use the
    budget-balanced multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein
    in Am Econ Rev 5:1577&-1587, 2002) according to which the
    game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules
    that can be applied in a wide range of situations. It is
    shown that the symmetric equilibria of the multibidding game deliver
    ex-post efficient outcomes if the number of agents is two,
    for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty,
    or is very large.