Endogenous Protection of R&D Investments Articles uri icon



publication date

  • February 2009

start page

  • 184

end page

  • 205


  • 1


  • 42

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0008-4085

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1540-5982


  • We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. We show that, contrary to findings in most of the literature, the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Consequently, as long as the R&D spillovers are not too strong, firms decide to let their R&D knowledge flow. Since, as we show, welfare is higher when R&D spillovers are present, it follows that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge could be welfare-enhancing.