Search, Money, and Inflation under Private Information Articles uri icon



publication date

  • January 2008

start page

  • 101

end page

  • 131


  • 1


  • 138

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0531

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-7235


  • I study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods. Introducing imperfect information in the Lagos&-Wright [A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113(3) (2005) 463&-484] economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment. In general, my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents holding money is endogenous and depends (negatively) on the level of expected inflation. As in Lagos and Wright's model, in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation, but the origins of this cost are very different.