Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case Articles uri icon

authors

  • SINOPOLI, FRANCESCO DE
  • IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA

publication date

  • April 2008

start page

  • 401

end page

  • 417

issue

  • 3

volume

  • 30

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0176-1714

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-217X

abstract

  • We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties. We want to thank Partha Dasgupta, Jean-François Mertens, Thomas Palfrey, and Shlomo Weber for precious discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for insightful comments. This paper was partially written while Francesco was visiting Tor Vergata University, which he thanks for the hospitality and financial support. Both authors thank the Ramon y Cajal Fellowship, and acknowledge research funding from the Spanish MEC, Grant SEJ2006-11665-C02-0.